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Abstract: Public policy permeates the legal principles of a state and its ruling government. The justification 
of public policy is topical to the ethics and canons acknowledged by that state. These values are 
determined by the applicable political, social, economic, religious, and legal systems, which differ among 
states. As public policy usually best illuminates the broad area of government laws, regulations, provincial 
ordinances, and court decisions, the standards creating public policy alter as states develop. The motif of 
public policy is critical when the question of enforcement of arbitral awards suffice. There is no definite 
meaning of the term in the famous Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Arbitration Convention) to enforce foreign arbitral awards. Hence, this paper explores 
and traces some contemporary trends in defense of public policy as an exception to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards worldwide. 
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The notion of public policy is a frequent component in the issue of arbitration in 
International Commercial Law. It is prominent among scholars and judges, although it is 
not susceptible to a commonly recognized definition. Nevertheless, theories agree that 
public policy reveals some moral, social, economic, or legal principles (Berger 1993). 
Although heavily criticized as a nebulous and ambiguous concept, public policy‟s role is 
nevertheless a fundamental one from many legal systems' viewpoints (Moran, Rein, and 
Goodin 2008). 
For Private International Law (Conflict of Laws or Choice of Law), public policy 
impedes the exercise of a foreign law that would otherwise be designated by the 
„conflict of laws‟ rules. The rationale for the effect of a public policy is to protect society‟s 
essential principles and the state as a whole. Thus, a public policy rule is construed as a 
“mechanism that corrects the „choice of law‟ designation for substantive reasons, 
namely, the defense of the forum‟s fundamental legal principles and moral values” 
(Gruson 2003). However, complexities evolve in defining the principles and values 
signifying the state‟s public policy (Dye 1992). The question about the degree of the 
constitutionality of stated legislation inexorably tends its head when the outcomes of 
applying the governing foreign law oppose a principle of another legal system that may 
apply to the legal relationship. 
Likewise, since public policy stands within the framework of implementing a 
specific state‟s legal principles, the interpretation of the public policy is susceptible to 
the values and standards accepted by that state. These standards are determined by the 
applicable economic, political, religious, social, and legal systems, which vary among 
societies. Therefore, the measures constituting public policy change as these societies 
develop (Sheppard 2003). Hence it is relevant to investigate the concept and trace some 
contemporary trends in defense of public policy as an exception to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards worldwide.  
 
MEANING AND SUBJECT MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY RULE IN  
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
It is appropriate to explain from the inception the idea of public policy in this 
discourse, and in detail, to differentiate the layers of public policy‟s exposition in 
international arbitration. It is therefore pertinent to define the key terms concerning it, 
and these are as follows. 
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The conflict of laws doctrines of public policy and „l'ordre public‟ is shaped by 
crucial local morality and social order forces (Nussbaum 1943). In practice, public policy 
shows a common-law origin while „l'ordre public‟ is associated with civil law and has a 
statutory source (Banu 2018). Public policy is defined by the House of Lords, England, in 
1853 as “that principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which 
tends to be injurious to the public or against public good”. In French courts, the concept 
of public policy or „l‟ordre public‟ denotes “the system of principles that reinforce the 
function of legal systems in each state” (Husserl 1938). This focuses on the economic, 
social, and moral values that bind a society together. In a nutshell, public policy means 
those ethical, social, or economic considerations exercised by courts as justifications for 
repudiating enforcement of an arbitral award being domestic or foreign.  
 
International Public Policy 
 
The term „international public policy‟ denotes the principles which state courts 
apply to foreign awards rather than domestic awards (Ghodoosi 2016). International 
public policy is recognized to be limited to national public policy because not every 
domestic public policy rule is automatically part of the international public policy. 
Nonetheless, international public policy is thorough and subjective to each state. A 
state‟s international public policy tends to be interpreted more narrowly than its 
domestic public policy. A foreign arbitral award is less likely than a domestic one to be 
refused enforcement. 
 
Substantive and Procedural International Public Policy 
 
Substantive public policy (l'ordre public au fond) covers the recognition of rights 
and obligations by a court or enforcement in a court about the merits of the decision, in 
contrast to procedural public policy; the process by which a dispute is decided (Howlett 
2017). An example of the objective and fundamental principle is good faith and 
prohibition of abuse of rights, especially in civil law states. Other examples cited by 
courts and commentators are pacta sunt servanda, prohibiting confiscation without 
charge, and prohibiting discrimination (Martinez 1990). There is a debate whether and 
to what extent the award of unlawful relief, for instance, if punitory or exemplary 
damages, constitutes a violation of international public policy. The category of 
fundamental principles also includes the proscription against actions that are contra 
bonos mores, such as genocide, piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, pedophilia, slavery, 
and smuggling.  
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Some fundamental principles, such as the prohibition against corruption, may 
also fall into one or more of the other categories. For example, permitting corruption 
may also be contrary to the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of 
Foreign Officials in International Transactions. Procedural principles include the 
requirement that the courts be impartial, issuing the award as induced or influenced by 
corruption, fraud, infringements of natural justice rules, and the equality in appointing 
the Court by parties. Notably, procedural public policy should not include mistakes 
regarding the law or the tribunal's facts unaccompanied by some extreme bureaucratic 
irregularity.  
In contrast to the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe's decision in Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Authority v. Maposa (Oppong 2013), the arbitrator stipulated the wrong start 
date in calculating the claimant‟s entitlement for lost salary. This led to a windfall to the 
claimant of approximately 13 months‟ salary. After reviewing the implementation policy 
bar of the New York Convention (the Convention) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), the Court held under Article 34 or 36 
of the Model Law, “the Court does not exercise an appealing power either to uphold or 
set aside or decline to recognize and enforce an award by having regard to what it 
considers should have been the correct decision”. However, the deliberation in an award 
is beyond mere faultiness or incorrectness. Creating intense discrimination in its 
defiance of logic or accepted moral standards, a sensible and fair-minded person would 
consider that the theory of justice in Zimbabwe to be unpopular since it is not in 
defense of the public policy. The same result applies when the arbitrator does not hold 
his opinion to the question, or the issue is misunderstood, and the resulting injustice 
extends the point cited above. 
Other examples often cited are currency controls, price-fixing rules, 
environmental protection laws, prohibitions, blockades, or boycotts, tax laws, laws to 
protect the parties are supposed to be in a lower negotiating position than consumer 
protection laws. An example of an international commitment is the United Nations 
Security Council resolution to impose sanctions. These decisions immediately bind UN 
member states under Article 25 of Chapter V of the UN Charter. 
A state is also bound to meet the terms with the treaties it has ratified. In Parsons 
& Whittemore (Evans 1975), the United States Court of Appeals held that public policy 
did not equate with „national policy‟ in the diplomatic or foreign policy sense and 
enforce an award in favor of the Egyptian party simply because of tensions at that time 
between the United States and Egypt. Would the outcome in National Oil Corp. v. 
Libyan Sun Oil Corp (Kuner 1990) be different today? The Delaware court denied a 
challenge to an award at the enforcement phase because it favored Libya, “a state is 
known to sponsor international terrorism”. The court noted that the United States still 
recognized Libya‟s government had not declared war on it and had expressly permitted 
it to bring an action to confirm the award. The Court said: “To read the public policy 
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defense as a parochial device protective of national political interests would seriously 
undermine the Convention‟s utility”. This provision was not intended to perpetuate 
international politics‟ vicissitudes under the heading of public policy. In Baker Marine 
(Nigeria) Limited v. Chevron (Nigeria) Limited, Baker Marine has sought to enforce two 
arbitral awards by a Nigerian court. The defeated party requested the evacuation prizes. 
After the Nigerian court overturned both cases, Baker Marine attempted to enforce the 
arbitration award in the United States following the New York Agreement, arguing that 
the Nigerian court‟s logic for revoking the awards was invalid under the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) criteria. The district court rejected the argument because Baker 
Marine agreed that disputes should be arbitrated under Nigerian law. There was no 
claim that the Nigerian Supreme Court was an incompetent authority in that country. 
Drawing on the principles of courtesy within the agreement, the second US Court of 
Appeals confirmed. 
 
Transnational or Truly International Public Policy 
 
Transnational public policy refers to those principles that represent a universal 
accord as to collective norms and putative standards of conduct that must always be 
applied (Pryles 2007). The concept comprises indispensable rules of natural law, 
universal justice principles, jus cogens in public international law, and the generally 
accepted principles of morality occasionally referred to as civilized nations (Stone 2008). 
Transnational public policy differs from public policy of any state, though it includes a 
public policy beyond state boundaries. Such public policy is well-defined as evolving out 
of an international consensus involving universal standards as to norms of conduct that 
are primarily recognized and approved as unacceptable in most civilized countries, such 
as bribery, corruption, slavery, religious discrimination, murder and, terrorism. It is widely 
established that transnational public policy has an even more restrictive scope than 
international public policy (Ryabinin and Varady 2018). 
 
Public Policy in the Arbitration Process 
 
Public policy evolves from two phases in the arbitration process: a) the arbitration 
process itself: where the arbitration resolves the conceivable conflict concerning the 
pertinent legal systems; and b) arbitral award: in the enforcement of the arbitral award 
before the national courts, the judge is possibly required to protect fundamental 
policies of the Forum. In deciding the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, 
national judges have conventionally been apprehensive with the public policy of the 
Forum. It has become a norm for reference to be made to a state‟s public policy in 
recognition and enforcement (Fei 2010). 
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Public Policy and Mandatory Rules 
 
An arbitral forum must discern between public policy and mandatory legal 
provisions known as „normes d‟application immediate ou necessaire‟ or „lois de police‟ 
(Hood 2009).In defining mandatory rules, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation states that: 
overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is 
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such 
as its political, social, or economic organization, to such an extent that they 
apply to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation. 
 
Temporarily used as synonymous, these provisions illustrate an analogous 
concept in various jurisdictions. They are commonly described as mandatory provisions 
set out in public interest. Under duress, it applies to all relationships connected with that 
legal system and may abound on any intractable conflict of law rules. 
Two characteristics of mandatory provisions follow from this definition: first, these 
rules are introduced to protect some policy essential to the state, and secondly, their 
application is demanded irrespective of and even before the designation of the 
substantive law governing the dispute (Dickinson 2012). Necessarily, all public policy 
rules are mandatory because they reflect the rudimentary beliefs of morality and justice. 
However, not all mandatory rules rise to public policy because the interests protected 
may not concern the societies‟ fundamental values.  
 
The Application of Mandatory of Rules 
 
Mandatory rules exist principally in four situations. These comprise force majeure, 





The tenets of force majeure permit arbitrators to review mandatory rules, making 
the execution of contractual obligations burdensome, given they were neither 
conceivable nor evident in the parties‟ contract. However, the mandatory rule is deemed 
under the lex contractus as an element of fact (International Council for Commercial 
Arbitration 1987). The arbitrator needs to pinpoint the applicable force majeure rules 
and then decide whether the provisions and practices of the mandatory rule in question 
satisfy that test. Therefore, the category of force majeure is not controversial since it 
requires that the arbitrators do nothing more than applying the parties‟ chosen law. For 
example, suppose trade sanctions from the African Union disrupted a contract governed 
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by English law to ship goods from the United Kingdom to Ghana. In that case, the 
sanctions may be tantamount to force majeure under the lex contractus. Nevertheless, 
they would not apply precisely. Also, not all cases will deal with force majeure in the 
same way, as their scope and implications will differ in the country's national legal 
history and politics, whose law regulates the dispute. 
 
Transnational Public Policy 
 
Homogenously, it is acknowledged that arbitrators must apply any mandatory 
rule that signifies transnational public policy to preserve minimum standards of conduct 
and behavior in international commercial relations (Kossuth and Sanders 1987). As 
transnational public policy symbolizes values that supersede those of distinct national 
systems, arbitrators have an utmost duty to the international community, which means 
they need to decline to apply any mandatory rules that conflict with transnational public 
policy. They should also turn down the parties‟ requests to apply chosen laws that 
conflict with such policies. The International Law Institute‟s Resolution on the Autonomy 
of Parties confirms this stance, affirming that “in no case shall an arbitrator violate 
international public policy principles as to which a broad consensus has emerged in the 
international community”(International Law Institute 1991). This statement clarifies that 
this approach‟s explanation rests not in the doctrine of the mandatory rule but in that of 
international public policy, justifying why this kind is undebatable. 
The obstacles with a transnational public policy are, primarily, for parties, the 
evidentiary hurdle in determining a given principle‟s universality; and second, for 
arbitrators, ambiguity as to the extent of universal acceptance required before the 
principle turn out to be truly international. Arbitrators' response if an express choice by 
the party conflicts with an established international public policy poses is a concern. 
Ideally, arbitrators are permitted to ignore the latter, but there are bottlenecks to uphold 
the jurisdiction if the express choice is overlooked. 
 
Mandatory Rules of the Lex Contractus 
 
Distinguishing between the lex contractus adopted by parties and those chosen 
by arbitrators is needful. The parties have selected the lex contractus on the one hand, 
and the lex contractus has been opted by the arbitrators on the other hand. The lex 
Contractus adopted by the parties is recognized if parties favor the lex contractus. Its 
mandatory rules must be applied, provided they are not divergent to transnational 
public policy. Arguably, suppose the parties had no anticipation for a mandatory rule of 
the lex contractus to be ignored. The arbitrator is obliged to respect their will as they 
could have opted for a law that did not cover the applicable mandatory provision 
(Bernardini 2008). This is valid if the only limit to the parties‟ control over the applicable 
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law is transnational public policy. It is putative that mandatory rules can be applied even 
when the parties do not want them; such resolution will be the admissible but not 
decisive factor in the arbitrators‟ verdict (Derains 1987). According to how it balances 
competing private interests, it is espoused that parties do not choose a law according to 
its public policy provisions (Voser 1998). Therefore, the impulsive application of 
mandatory rules of the lex contractus is futile to party expectations, giving unjustifiable 
benefit to the state's public policy goals that afford the lex contractus (Park, Craig, and 
Paulsson 2000). 
 
The Lex Contractus Chosen by the Arbitrators 
 
There is often a failure on the part of parties to opt for a law to apply to their 
relations, either because they cannot agree on a rule, they had inept lawyers who 
overlooked a choice of law clause, or because they are more involved with making a 
deal than planning for its undoing (Mistelis 2009). When this ensues, arbitrators can 
typically either opt for the conflict of law rules or hastily prefer the substantive law they 
deem suitable. Either way, arbitrators must endorse the law that best concurs with the 
parties‟ legitimate expectations, even though differences between expectations 
regarding ultimate substantive law and expectations as to applicable conflict principles. 
Upon determining the substantive law, the conventional procedure is for arbitrators to 
employ applicable mandatory rules inevitably. Besides, mandatory rules are applied 
more swiftly than where an express choice of law exists (Chukwumerije 1994). 
By not unequivocally acquiescing to the arbitrators deciding the applicable law, 
the parties may have expected no more than the arbitrators‟ choice to be treated as if it 
were the parties‟ own. This would make it difficult to rationalize applying foreign 
mandatory rules more readily than situations where a choice of law clause is present. 
Conversely, by leaving it up to the arbitrators to choose the applicable law, it may be 
that the parties do not care as much about which law applies. This method fits cogently 
with and even supports the „parties‟ expectations‟ category as argued. Adopting such a 
type makes the variance between a party and arbitrator choice of the lex contractus 
redundant. 
 
Rules of the Seat 
 
Jurisdictional purists suppose that arbitrators‟ powers originate from the law of 
the seat and so will inevitably employ its mandatory rules (Ogunranti 2019). On the 
contrary, contractualist purists deny the importance of the seat and so would, in theory, 
be hesitant to apply its mandatory rules at least where they correlate to substantive, as 
opposed to procedural, issues (Naón 1992). In procedural matters, designating the seat 
ought to at least involve acceptance of the lex arbiteri. Regarding the substantive rules, 
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the assessment may be influenced by the selected procedural rules. For example, the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules reveals that when the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration scrutinizes arbitrations under its jurisdiction, it considers, to the 
extent practicable, the requirements of mandatory rules at the place of arbitration. While 
this does not require mandatory rules to be applied, the Court is generally reluctant to 
interfere in the awards' substantive parts. Article 27 of ICC Rules states (ICC Rules of 
Arbitration 1998) that: 
Before signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft form 
to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the 
Award and, without affecting the Arbitral Tribunal's liberty of decision, may 
also draw its attention to points of substance. No Award shall be rendered 
by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the Court as to its 
form. 
 
It is worthy to note that most national arbitration statutes provide another basis 
for setting aside awards made within their territory. The New York Convention consents 
non-enforcement if an award has been put aside or barred by an adept authority of the 
country it was made, Article V (1) (e) stipulates: “The award has not yet become binding 
on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which or under the law of which that award was made”. Therefore, 
enforceability matters should provide mandatory rules of the seat a solid assertion to be 
employed, at least in as much as they signify the pertinent public policy. The New York 
Convention is only non-mandatory; preference is given to party autonomy should there 
be a conflict. With the prevalent acceptance of the Model Law (United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law 1995), several states may have identical 
mandatory procedural rules for arbitrations. If an award contravenes such a provision at 
the seat, jurisdictions that have ratified the Model Law are not likely to approve 
enforcement.  
Where substantive mandatory rules entail, the issue is indistinct. Provided that 
there are some, even though not numerous jurisdictions seen to implement awards that 
have been set aside at the seat, Austria, Belgium, France, and the US have recognized 
and enforced awards set aside at the seat of arbitration. However, this has often been 
done under local law, not the New York Convention (Redfern and Hunter 2004). 
Enforceability concerns will not be vast if such cases are plausible. For instance, where 
there is no relevant substantive mandatory rule issue from either party‟s home country 
or the enforcement country. Still, a case may arise if the seat fails to stipulate the 
contract's applicable law and the plausible place of enforcement in a, particularly pro-
enforcement country. To admit, contractualist arguments in this circumstance are 
challenging because an arbitrator is under strict obligation by a sovereign state to do 
their bidding. As the direction is intended at the parties and the arbitrator is assigned 
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with giving force to it utilizing a mandatory rule, the same would be true. If not, the 
arbitrator would be aiding the stalling of the state‟s direction (Beatson 2017). In fact, by 
law, this is not sanctioned. 
One exception may be substantive rules that are expressed as mandatory and not 
intended to apply to the dispute‟s specific fact situation. For example, if the mandatory 
competition or anti-trust rules, designed to protect a state‟s domestic market, are 
expressed broadly enough to prohibit a relationship which has only a fragile connection 
to that market, and the parties are foreign and have chosen the seat purely for 
convenience, then it is arguable that the law need not be applied.  
Following this exception and the well-known opinions advocating against the 
critical application of all relevant mandatory rules of the seat, it would be going too far 
to consider their application entirely uncontroversial (Petrochilos 2004). 
 
Arbitrability and Public Policy 
 
The issue of arbitrability of a dispute is critical in discussing public policy. The 
rules on arbitrability may limit parties‟ freedom to substitute arbitration for the 
jurisdiction of the national courts by excluding specific subject matter from arbitration, 
so-called objective arbitrability, or restricting certain parties' ability to participate in 
arbitral proceedings subjective arbitrability. 
A precondition for determining the arbitrators‟ competence, arbitrability may 
arise as soon as the parties submit the dispute to arbitration. At this initial stage, one of 
the parties may assert a lack of arbitrability either before the arbitral tribunal or directly 
before a national court. The question may be raised in proceedings before national 
courts at the time of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. According to 
Article V (2) (a) of the New York Convention, arbitrability constitutes a separate ground 
for the refusal to enforce arbitral awards. 
According to some opinions (Sattar 2011), this text may be excessive because 
arbitrability is part of public policy and included in Article V (2) (b). Others (Dar 2015) 
argue that rules regarding the arbitrability of disputes do not always rise to the level of 
public policy. Although legal provisions determining arbitration are always mandatory, 
some commentators argue that restrictions on certain disputes' arbitrability may not 
reflect national policies of such a fundamental character to qualify them as public policy 
issues. In the area of objective arbitrability, issues regarding consumer protection, anti-
trust and competition, industrial and intellectual property rights, restrictions on foreign 
trade, foreign exchange restrictions, and securities transactions are among the subject 
matters most commonly proposed for exclusion from the jurisdiction of arbitrators. 
The concept of subjective arbitrability refers to certain entities‟ capacity, such as 
the state and state institutions, to conclude arbitral agreements. The limitations are 
usually related to one of the parties' particular relationships to the state, such as state-
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controlled enterprises. Two questions arise in this respect. The first one is whether the 
responsible government official or other authority had lawfully bound the respective 
entity to arbitrate. This issue is to be solved by the applicable law as determined by the 
choice-of-law rules. The second question relates to the principle of sovereign immunity. 
It is a generally accepted principle of international public policy that a state party to an 
arbitral agreement may not claim exemption from arbitral proceedings to which it has 
acceded by a previous contract. However, suppose the state party's contractual 
obligations conflict with what would be considered a significant national interest by the 
National Forum. In that case, the public policy defense might prevent the award's 
enforcement against that party in its home state. 
 
The Interpretation of Public Policy by Diverse Courts 
 
The various terminologies used in national legislation, case law, and 
commentaries suggest that courts of multiple countries apply a constricted public policy 
concept (Sheppard 2004). France and Portugal's legislations recommend the application 
of international public policy (Graffi 2006). The courts of several other European civil law 
countries like Germany, Italy, and Switzerland (Rowley, Gaillard, and Kaiser 2019) 
expressly apply international public policy. Commentators from other countries like the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Norway, and Sweden state that their courts apply public 
policy restrictively (Beatson 2017). However, the international public policy‟s application 
is generally the country‟s public policy in question, which applies to international awards 
and not transnational public policy. When remarking on the French approach Fouchard 
and Goldman (1999) noted: “The international public policy to which Article 1502.5 
refers can only mean the French conception of international public policy or, in other 
words, the set of values a breach of which could not be tolerated by the French legal 
order, even in international cases”. 
Some courts have approved the application of transnational public policy, but 
this has not received widespread acceptance. The Milan Court of Appeals (1992) may 
have considered a more transnational concept in re-counting the international public 
policy as a “body of universal principles shared by nations of like civilization, pointing to 
protect fundamental human rights, often personified in international conventions”. Swiss 
Federal Court at WV. F. and V. (1994) supported considering a “universal comprehension 
of public policy, in which an award will be contradictory with the public policy if it is 
divergent to the underlying moral or legal principle admitted in all civilized countries”.  
Yet, in Les Emirats Arabes Unis v. Westland Helicopters (1994), after a long 
academic dialogue, rebuffed their stance, preferring instead pragmatic approach. In 
France, the Paris Court of Appeal demonstrated uncertainty about applying this theory 
in Fougerolle v Procofrance (1990). It is noteworthy that certain activities, such as 
corruption, violate both French public policy and international business ethics.  
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Common law states also restrict the scope of public policy but neglect the 
transnational policy. The United States applies a restrictive concept of public policy. For 
example, public policy definition often cited in international arbitration is Judge Joseph 
Smith's description at Parsons & Whitmore (Evans 1975). He considers the enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award might be refuted for policy reasons “only where enforcement 
would violate the forum state‟s most basic notions of morality and justice”. The same 
year, the Supreme Court, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. (Deason 2005), recognized the 
difference between domestic and international public policy. It had implemented an 
arbitration agreement on an emerging claim in international trade. However, arbitration 
on a similar claim would have been prohibited if it had arisen from a domestic 
transaction.  
English courts are yet to explicitly incorporate the concept of international public 
policy though their emphasis is on the importance of the final nature of the awards 
when considering an objection to enforcement based on illegality and have endorsed a 
restrictive concept of public policy. For example, the English Court of Appeal Sir John 
Donaldson MR, in D.S.T. v. Rakoil (1987) and the Supreme Court, in Renusagar Power Co. 
Ltd v. General Electric Co.1994 (Aragaki 2018) in India. Public policy has been interpreted 
more restrictively than previously. The Court held that to attract the policy bar, it is 
required to enforce the decision more than violating India‟s law in consideration that the 
term „public policy‟ should be interpreted in the sense in which the principle of public 
policy is applied in the area of private international law and that the enforcement of a 
foreign decision contradicts with the public policy if it conflicts with (a) the fundamental 
policy of Indian law; (b) India‟s interests; or (c) Justice and ethics. A Singaporean judge 
(Ho 1996) reiterated: “The principle of comity of nations requires that the awards of 
foreign arbitration tribunals be given due deference and be enforced unless exceptional 
circumstances exist”. A 1999 decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal highlights 
the issues faced by many courts the world over and how the International Law 
Association (ILA) sought to give guidance. The Court addressed whether the applicable 
public policy was that of Hong Kong or some shared public policy and to what extent a 
national court could or should look at the practice of other courts.  
The Court overruled the idea that public policy under the New York Agreement 
concerned some “standard common to all civilized nations”. However, public policy has 
been narrowly interpreted. It stated that the refusal to implement a decision of the New 
York Convention for policy reasons, “the award must be so fundamentally offensive to 
that jurisdiction‟s notion of justice that, despite it being a party to the Convention, it 
cannot reasonably be expected to overlook the objection”. The Court accepted that, in 
numerous cases, the relevant policy of the Forum was consistent with the policy of other 
countries and that it would be appropriate to examine the willingness of other state 
courts to proceed with the enforcement of the Convention‟s decisions made in 
conditions that did not meet their domestic standards. 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 7, No. 1, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 63 
International Law Association (ILA) Recommendations on Public Policy 
 
The ILA was founded in Brussels in 1873, its current headquarters in London. The 
ILA comprises 20 Committees and 8 study groups ranging between public, private, and 
commercial law, with 52 members in the Arbitration Committee covering different 
continents. The ILA International Commercial Arbitration Committee conducted a six-
year study into public policy application by enforcement courts (Mayer and Sheppard 
2003) and concluded in 2002. Despite the distinctive legal and cultural traditions of state 
courts, public policy seldom precludes international awards enforcement. The 
Committee resolved that greater harmonization of approach would pilot significant 
uniformity and predictability, which would dissuade unmeritorious disputes to awards. 
The ILA recommended the application of „international public policy‟, namely, that 
element of a state's public policy that would avert a party from citing a foreign law or 
foreign judgment or foreign award if breached. It did, however, identify various 
categories of international public policy by observing that the international public policy 
of any state includes: 
 Fundamental principles, on justice or morality that the state wishes to protect 
even when it is not directly concerned. 
 Rules designed to serve the essential political, social, or economic interests of the 
state, known as „lois de police‟ or „public policy rules‟; and  





The public policy omission to recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitral awards establishes ambiguity concerning enforcement of these awards, mainly 
because the contracting states have diverse approaches to public policy issues. For 
instance, on the subject of transnational law, Jessup (1940) defined it as “the law which 
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontier including both public/private 
law distinctions”. In recent times, the term „transnational law‟ is used to describe law 
creation in the broad context by governments, international organizations, and non-
state actors, for example, commercial organizations. While this theory was developed for 
public international law, it has long since been advocated in private international law 
and commercial arbitration. 
Besides, this paper incorporates a different definition of the term „transnational 
law‟. Transnational law depicts legal principles generally recognized by a significant 
number of national laws. These universal law principles differ from private entities‟ 
standard rules because they derive their binding force from national laws. However, they 
are also inconsistent with the regulations laid down by the state because they are more 
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general principles on which these laws are based. The general principles theory of law is 
that there are basic ideas of justice found in a wide range of national laws and directly 
applied to legal disputes. It is a slightly platonic notion that one can see pure pictures of 
justice through national laws‟ shadows. 
The elemental stage of arbitration is the question of arbitrability. Arbitrability 
delineates arbitral issues and non-arbitral ones. Arbitrability hence extends to the 
arbitral tribunal‟s jurisdiction over a dispute. Arbitration premises on the parties‟ 
contractual agreement. There are two reasons why the arbitral tribunal may lack 
jurisdiction; either the parties have not reached a settlement to submit the specific 
dispute to arbitration, or the dispute cannot be submitted arbitration at all. The former 
is a question of contract interpretation, while the latter pertains to complex 
considerations of public policy. It is the latter question that has created most problems 
in arbitral practice. 
Article V (2) (b) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Article 36 (1) (b) (ii) of UNCITRAL‟s Model Law both 
stipulate that a state may fail to enforce an award if it is contrary to the public policy of 
the state in which may fail to enforce an award if it is contrary to the public policy of the 
state in which the enforcement is intended.  
Unfortunately, neither defines „public policy‟. The International Bar Association 
declared the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention in October 2015, 
reaffirming that public policy is an elusive and evolving concept deficient in precise 
definitions. While the New York Convention has been hailed by many, it is deemed by 
some that the public policy exception would weaken the purposes of the Convention. 
There have been concerns it granted a fruitless defendant and the state a „second bite‟ 
at frustrating enforcement. While others perceived it as an essential „safety-valve‟. The 
New York Convention architects sought to restrict the public policy clause‟s scope as far 
as possible. 
The cases reviewed in this paper show that Article V (2) (b) of the Convention has 
not generated any significant disruption. Attempts to withstand enforcement on 
justifications of arbitrability and public policy have rarely been successful. A more 
feasible way forward towards accomplishing better predictability would be for the 
international arbitration community to reach a comprehensive agreement as to which 
„exceptional circumstances‟ would justify a national court denying enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award and for the courts to have regard to any such consensus. The time 
has come for there to be a comprehensive model of „arbitrability‟. It is anticipated that 
the ILA Recommendations embody a broad consensus. This would provide more clarity 
in understanding and implementing public policy as a bar to the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards if implemented. Most major arbitral jurisdictions define 
public policy or „l‟ordre public‟ narrowly and utilize it remarkably when an award 
infringes fundamental and largely international legal norms.   
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Undeniably, the public policy violation must attain a precise upper limit to justify 
declining enforcement, such as „blatant‟, „flagrant‟, or „intolerable‟. The exclusion can 
legally apply, for instance, to awards concerning contracts that would be illegal under 
national laws, such as those concerning crime. 
There is a reassuring tendency toward the pervasive approval of a narrow analysis 
of the public policy exception. For example, the Indian Supreme Court was once 
infamous for a string of decisions endorsing an ever-expanding definition of public 
policy to include the mere error of law, an approach rejected by the US and all leading 
European jurisdictions. The Indian Arbitration Act 2015 now explicitly precludes refusal 
of enforcement of foreign awards based on „patent illegality‟ or law error. The High 
Court of Delhi asserted that the amendments „brought about a material change‟ and 
that the public policy defense must be interpreted „extremely narrowly‟, for example, in 
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Limited. 
A Chinese court in 2016 rejected to enforce an ICC award on the foundation that 
it breached Chinese law obliging that all arbitrations must be institutional, and the Court 
found that the ICC arbitration was not unequivocally institutional. This decision 
amalgamates Chinese domestic law with public policy and is hence open to criticism. 
Given that developments have been observed any decision of the Chinese court refusing 
to enforce a foreign award since 2000 is subjected to the Supreme People‟s Court‟s 
mandatory review on a more pro-enforcement basis, the decision may yet be repealed.  
In Sinocore International Co Ltd v. RBRG Trading (UK) Ltd, 2017, the United Kingdom 
reiterated its „pro-enforcement bias‟, stressing that enforcement of awards about legal 
contracts and awards would not be „ruined‟ by fraud or bribery. Thus, English courts are 
not adamant about enforcing a contract procured by bribery. Some jurisdictions do still 
retain an unsophisticated methodology to the public policy omission. For example, 
Egyptian courts have considered the ensuing fall under the public policy exception: the 
absence of perceptive for damages awarded by the tribunal, late payment interest 
exceeding the maximum ceiling set out in the Egyptian Civil Code, and mandatory 
approval of the competent minister to arbitrate a dispute arising out of an 
administrative contract. Russian courts usually refuse enforcement of awards where the 
number of damages is deemed punitive or disproportionate to the breach. Other 
jurisdictions such as Poland, Finland, Italy, Greece, and, currently, Portugal have objected 
to enforcing awards on the same footing. 
New tendencies in the analysis of the public policy exception by legislators and 
national courts encourage prudent confidence that leading jurisdictions have come 
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